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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SOCIETY OF SEPARATIONISTS, INC. 
a Maryland non-profit 
corporation; CHRIS ALLEN; and# 
RICHARD ANDREWS, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
JAY B. TAGGART, Utah State 
Superintendent of Public 
Instruction, 
Defendant/Appellee 
Case No. 91-0387 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
THE HON. TIMOTHY R. HANSON, JUDGE PRESIDING 
(Trial Court Case No. CV-91-090-2848) 
THE PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS, SOCIETY OF SEPARATIONISTS, 
INC., CHRIS ALLEN AND RICHARD ANDREWS, (collectively herein-
after "the Society"), by and through their counsel of 
record, BRIAN M. BARNARD and JOHN PACE submit the following 
Reply Brief in further support of their appeal and in 
response to issues raised by appellee in his recent brief. 
1 
RECORD ON APPEAL 
At more than point in his brief, the defendant, Jay 
Taggart, the former Utah State Superintendent of Schools 
(hereinafter "the Superintendent") claims that the Society 
filed no response in the court below to the Superintendent's 
Motion to Dismiss and supporting memorandum.1 The 
Superintendent makes this assertion despite the fact that 
his counsel received a copy of the Society's opposition 
memorandum and filed a pleading objecting to the Society's 
opposition memorandum being untimely filed in this matter. 
T.R. p. 31-32. While the index of the record on appeal does 
not currently include the Society's opposition memorandum, 
the computer entries of the Third Judicial District Court in 
and for Salt Lake County indicate that the trial court 
clerk's office did indeed receive the Society's memorandum 
on July 8, 1991. The Society has written to the Clerk's 
Office of the Third Judicial District Court, requesting that 
this oversight be corrected and that the memorandum be 
included in the record on appeal. This request (a letter of 
1
 Whether plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition 
to defendant Superintendent's motion to dismiss is of little 
moment. With or without a memorandum in opposition to 
defendant's motion to dismiss, the trial court must still 
objectively examine the complaint and determine its validity 
under Rule 12 (b), tft.R.Civ.Pro. 
2 
August 26, 1992) is attached as Exhibit "L". Thus, the 
Society's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss was 
filed with the Third District Court before Judge Hanson 
ruled in this case and was received by counsel for the 
Superintendent in time for him to object to the lateness of 
the filing. That Memorandum is part of the pleadings in 
this case and should be incorporated as part of the record 
for appeal. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Characterizing this appeal as a review of purely legal 
questions — dismissal for lack of standing or for mootness 
— the Superintendent appropriately confirms that this Court 
need not defer to the lower court's ruling. Curiously, the 
Superintendent adds that where the lower court had made 
factual determinations, this Court must apply the 
substantial evidence standard on review. However, in the 
present case, there are no factual determinations to which 
this Court must defer. Because the Society's claim was 
dismissed under Rule 12(b)2 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
2
 The grounds for the lower court's dismissal of this 
case are unclear. While the judgment does grant the 
Superintendent's motion to dismiss, the ruling could be 
based on a 12(b)(6) motion — a failure to state a claim, or 
3 
Procedure, any conclusions in the lower court are 
necessarily conclusions of law. Standing and mootness are 
strictly legal questions while procedural law clearly 
establishes that for the purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) 
dismissal — no factual disputes are reached. Instead, the 
facts must be construed in a manner most favorable to the 
plaintiff. 
The Superintendent also fails to recognize the 
particularly lenient standard to review a judgment granting 
a motion to dismiss: "When challenging a dismissal under 
Rule 12(b)(6) [Utah Rules of Civil Procedure] the appellant 
is entitled to a generous standard of review." Olson v. 
Park-Craicr-Olson, Inc. . 167 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 20 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991), P.2d , citing Arrow Industries v. Zions 
First National Bank. 767 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1988) 
(Dismissal for failure to state a claim appropriate only 
"where it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would 
not be entitled to relief under any state of facts which 
could be proved in support of its claim.") (emphasis added). 
To determine the propriety of dismissal under Rule 12 
(b)(6), the reviewing court must "accept the factual 
upon lack of standing or a finding of mootness which can be 
considered jurisdictional issues. 
4 
allegations in the complaint as true and consider them and 
all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them in a light 
most favorable to the plaintiff." Coleman v. Utah State 
Land Board. 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990). Whether a trial 
court properly granted a motion to dismiss is a question of 
law to be reviewed under a correctness standard; the trial 
court,s ruling is given no deference. St. Benedict's Dev. 
v. St. Benedicts's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991) 
Regardless of the grounds for dismissal of this case, 
this Court owes no deference to the conclusions of the trial 
court. In addition to applying a generous standard of 
review to the Society's claims, this Court must assume the 
truth of all factual allegations in the complaint and must 
make all reasonable inferences which favor the plaintiffs' 
claims. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For the purposes of this appeal of a Rule 12(b)(6), 
Ut.R.Civ.Pro. dismissal, this Court must accept the material 
allegations of the Society's complaint as true and must 
indulge all reasonable inferences in the Society's favor. 
Arrow Industries, 767 P.2d at 936. Therefore, any opposi-
tion or attempt at contravention by the Superintendent to 
5 
the factual allegations contained in the Society7s complaint 
is inappropriate. By filing a motion to dismiss, the 
defendant "admits" all of the facts in plaintiff's complaint 
contending that even if proved the facts do not establish a 
cause of action or claim. Necessarily, the defendant 
forfeits the opportunity to contest factual allegations in 
the complaint. 
In addition, because a Rule 12(b)(6) judgment is a 
ruling on the pleadings, a reviewing court is not troubled 
with whether evidence exists to support the allegations in 
the complaint. Instead, the court is concerned with whether 
there is some set of facts which the plaintiff can 
hypothetically prove to validate her claim. Again, the 
Superintendent's repeated objections in his brief to the 
lack of evidence, the lack of a record and the lack of 
findings of fact in this case are improper. 
The Superintendent in his recent brief makes additional 
"factual" assertions that are difficult to swallow. 
Admitting that in July, 1990, the federal Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit affirmed a lower federal court 
decision that prayer at public school graduations was 
unconstitutional, the Superintendent laments that litigation 
over the prayer issue in Utah meant that "public officials 
6 
were at the mercy of anyone who claimed a violation by 
either allowing or preventing prayer." Appellee,s Brief at 
6. With a little research, the Superintendent would have 
realized that the state is under no obligation to make state 
facilities available for religious worship, Abinaton School 
District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Bell v. Little Axe 
Independent School District No. 70, 766 F.2d 1391 (10th Cir. 
1985) (distinction on basis of religious content in limited 
forum of public schools justified under the establishment 
clause), and is prevented from doing so under state law. 
Utah Const. Article I, § 4. Rather than seeking reversal of 
the First Circuit position, the Superintendent could have 
abided by clear Tenth Circuit and federal Supreme Court 
precedent which, endorsing the Lemon test, uniformly 
rejected prayer at public schools. Edwards v. Acruillard, 
482 U.S. 578 (1987); Roberts v. Madicran. 921 F.2d 1047 (10th 
Cir. 1990); Bell v. Little Axe. 766 F.2d at 1402 (10th Cir. 
1985) (recognizing "the special concern for religious 
neutrality in the public school setting") ; see also Jacrer v. 
Douglas County School District. 862 F.2d 824, 829 fn. 9 
(11th Cir. 1989) ("There is no rationale for applying this 
limited, historically-based [Marsh] exception to religious 
invocations that occur prior to high school football 
7 
games."). To render the "Utah litigation moot," the 
Superintendent needed only to halt the practice of prayer at 
high school graduations. The applicable law in Utah and in 
the federal 10th Circuit would have clearly supported such a 
move. Id. 
Because the Superintendent bypassed an obvious, neutral 
and legal opportunity to solve his "dilemma" by terminating 
the practice of prayer in Utah public schools, his support 
of the Providence, Rhode Island school board appeal 
represents — that much more — a pro-prayer stance. 
Additionally, even though the Superintendent contends that 
Utah took no position on the merits of the Rhode Island 
case, he admits that the appeal for which taxpayer money was 
allocated was a request to overrule the First Circuit's 
injunction against prayer at graduation ceremonies. 
Appellee's Brief at 7. This is not a neutral stance but 
out-right support for the position that prayer should be 
allowed in the public schools. Certainly, the 
Superintendent did not expect the Rhode Island school board 
to seek certiorari review of their case hoping that the 
Supreme Court would affirm the Court of Appeals' opinion. 
Therefore, despite the Superintendent's attempts to 
characterize his ten-thousand dollar ($10,000.00) gift to 
8 
the Rhode Island pro-prayer legal campaign as neutral, the 
appropriation should be recognized as an obvious expenditure 
of Utah public funds to aid the practice of religious 
worship in Utah's public schools as well as in the schools 
of Rhode Island. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah courts are unwilling to deny deserving plaintiffs 
access to and an opportunity for a hearing on the merits of 
their claims. None of the Superintendent's arguments 
against allowing the Society an avenue for resolution of 
their claims can overcome the reluctance of the courts to 
turn away a complaining party. The Superintendent cannot 
refute the Society's claims: Although, in part, technically 
moot, the Society's causes of action readily fall in to the 
exceptions to the mootness doctrine. In addition, as 
taxpayers, the members of the Society have standing to 
assert their claims of unconstitutional appropriation of 
public funds. The mere fact that the Superintendent was 
able to send ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) off to Rhode 
Island before plaintiffs filed this suit, does not prevent 
plaintiffs from challenging his mis-conduct and seeking a 
declaratory judgment as to the illegal nature of the act. 
9 
Finally, examination of the Superintendent's justifi-
cations for his unlawful expenditure reveal that his 
arguments are unconvincing. The detailed and absolute 
language of Article I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution 
specifically prohibits the disposal of public funds in aid 
of religious exercise. No characterization of the Super-
intendent's activities can hide the unlawfulness of his 
contribution to the Rhode Island pro-prayer legal campaign. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Society's Request for Declaratory Relief Requires 
Judicial Attention. 
The Superintendent's arguments that the plaintiffs' 
claims are not properly before this Court misfire. The 
Society's request for declaratory relief raises consti-
tutional questions and issues of official conduct of 
particular importance to Utah's citizens. The willingness 
of various Utah officials to financially support pro-
religion litigation in Rhode Island also indicates that 
their behavior is likely to be repeated. Finally, ample 
case law indicates that, as taxpayers, individual plaintiffs 
and the Society have standing to challenge the unlawful 
expenditure of public funds and to seek declaratory relief 
even after the expenditure has been made. 
10 
A. The Issues Presented by the Case Before the Court are 
Not Moot. 
Interestingly, to argue for his position that the 
Society's claim is moot, the Superintendent emphasizes that 
"[t]here is nothing left for this [C]ourt to enjoin." 
Superintendent's Brief at 13. This comment and others like 
it ignore that the Society's complaint seeks judicial 
declaration of the unconstitutionality of the 
Superintendent's ten-thousand dollar ($10,000.00) 
expenditure. While the Society's request for injunctive 
relief may indeed be moot, its request for declaratory 
relief deserves judicial attention.3 By mis-characterizing 
the Society's claim as a request for only injunctive relief, 
the Superintendent avoids addressing compelling arguments 
favoring a declaratory ruling on the merits of this case. 
Indeed, the Superintendent fails to recognize that 
analysis of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine further 
indicates that the Society's request for declaratory relief 
deserves judicial attention. None of the arguments advanced 
3
 However, references to past promises of Utah's 
public officials to become more involved in the Rhode Island 
School Prayer case — issues pertinent to the issue of 
injunctive relief — remain relevant in this case. The 
willingness of these officials to advance religious exercise 
with expenditures from the public coffers indicate that 
these officials found nothing reprehensible and that similar 
spending practices are likely to reoccur in the future. 
11 
by the Superintendent counter the Society's right to have a 
hearing. For example, by citing Hoyle v. Monson, 606 P.2d 
240 (Utah 1980), the Superintendent fails to lend credence 
to his position. Rather than refusing to decide a 
constitutional question because of mootness, the Hoyle Court 
determined that plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue their 
claims. The Hoyle plaintiffs were challenging the 
constitutionality of a filing fee required of candidates for 
United States Congress as applied to impecunious candidates. 
Because plaintiffs were not impecunious, the Court concluded 
that they lacked standing to bring their claim. Although 
the Superintendent quotes Hoyle to support his mootness 
claim, the case provides no support for this mootness 
assertion. 
The Superintendent further insists that "[t]he fact 
that it is theoretically possible that the state may make 
unconstitutional expenditures some time in the future is 
irrelevant." Appellee's Brief at 14. Quite the contrary, 
that an issue is "likely to recur in a similar manner" is 
exactly analysis adopted to determine when a claim, though 
technically moot, is justiciable. Wickham v. Fisher, 629 
P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1981); Kelp v. Schwendiman, 735 P.2d 413 
12 
(Utah 1987).4 The Superintendent wants to convince this 
Court that there is no reasonable expectation that Utah 
public officials will again appropriate public funds in a 
manner similar — not necessarily identical — to this case. 
At the same time, the Superintendent argues that his 
expenditure was necessary because the then current federal 
constitutional establishment law was not settled. Clearly, 
similar uncertainty is likely to reoccur often in the area 
of religious establishment law, and Utah public officials 
will be tempted again to contribute to legal campaigns which 
support religious exercise. Indeed, there was little, if 
any, disagreement concerning the prohibition of prayer in 
public schools — indicating that whenever the slightest 
confusion over the law exists, Utah public officials will 
feign confusion and feel free to invest public funds in 
securing a legal outcome favorable to religious exercise.5 
4
 Although the Utah Courts are not bound by the strict 
"case and controversy" jurisdictional requirement of the 
federal Constitution, the Superintendent attempts to bolster 
his contentions with reference to federal law. 
5
 The weakness of the Superintendent's assertions that 
future, unlawful expenditures are unlikely to occur is 
evident when his reasoning is further analyzed. For 
example, if the Rhode Island prayer case had been decided 
differently, if graduation prayer had been allowed on the 
basis of the Marsh test, then there would be ample 
opportunity for Utah to become involved in all sorts of 
litigation concerning prayer in public schools — litigation 
13 
Finally, and most importantly, if the issues in this 
case are not addressed, then any similar expenditures in the 
future will also be effectively immune from constitutional 
challenge. The Superintendent argues that since the money 
has already been sent off to Rhode Island, he is not 
answerable either for injunctive or declaratory relief.6 
The Superintendent should not be able to thus hide behind 
the mootness doctrine since the issues raised by his actions 
would "evade review" contrary to the judicial policy of the 
courts of Utah. Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 896 (Utah 
1981) .7 
to which it was not a party. Yet, the actual outcome of the 
Rhode Island prayer case should not determine whether the 
issue of the constitutionality of the Superintendent's past 
expenditure. 
6
 The Superintendent falsely states that counsel for 
the Society was informed before payment of the ten thousand 
dollars ($10,000.00) was made, that the money would be sent 
to Rhode Island. Appellee's Brief, p. 15. In fact, counsel 
for the Society was informed for the first time, by a letter 
of March 11, 1991 from Douglas F. Bates, attorney for the 
State Board of Education that the money had already been 
sent to Rhode Island, based upon authorization (dated 
January 23, 1991) from the Attorney General to do so. This 
action was filed on Law Day, May 1, 1991. 
7
 The Superintendent erroneous objects to the 
Society's discussion of a "range of possible violations of 
article I, § 4 by Utah officials." Appellee's Brief at 13. 
However, the test for an exception to the mootness doctrine 
must involve consideration of future events, uncertain to 
occur. Ignoring strong precedent which determined that 
issues almost identical those raised in the present case 
14 
B. Both the Society and individual Plaintiffs Have Standing 
to Challenge the Superintendent's Unlawful Expenditure of 
Public Funds. 
The Superintendent errs when he boldly asserts that, on 
the basis of Jenkins v, Swan, 675 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1983), the 
Society lacks standing to challenge the Superintendent's 
unlawful expenditures. While Jenkins was denied standing to 
contest service of Utah educators in the Utah Legislature, 
the Utah Supreme Court determined that it was because 
Jenkins was not a resident of a school district that adopted 
or engaged in the challenge practice. Id. Thus, "Jenkins7 
interest [was] less direct than the interest of those living 
in the relevant school districts of legislative districts." 
Id. at 1151. Rather than rejecting taxpayer standing to 
challenge contest unconstitutional appropriations of public 
funds, Jenkins upholds the practice of the Utah courts to 
grant "taxpayers standing to challenge the actions of 
political subdivisions for illegal expenditures and to 
were indeed likely to reoccur, the Superintendent improperly 
equates the notion of "similar" case to that of "identical" 
case. He quotes (federal court) language that maintains 
that the future cases must involve the same "complaining" 
party, Appellee's Brief at 16, and then suggests that the 
Superintendent will not be involved in any future unlawful 
expenditures of public funds. However, the Society, not the 
Superintendent is the complaining party in this case and is 
very likely to become involved in future litigation over the 
propriety of appropriations of public funds to aid religious 
worship, exercise or instruction. 
15 
challenge the illegal use of public funds." Olson v. Salt 
Lake City School District, 724 P.2d 960, 962 fn. 1 (Utah 
1986) (citing, among other cases, Jenkins v. Swan at 1152-
53). Therefore, there is no doubt that the individual 
plaintiffs and the Society have standing as taxpayers to 
bring this present action.8 
The Superintendent's next argument against the 
Society's right to bring this action suggests that someone, 
other than plaintiffs, has a greater interest in the outcome 
of this case and that the issues in this case would be 
raised even if the Society were denied standing. Appellee's 
Brief at 18. This argument falls flat. Although there are 
other cases, to which the Society is a party, that deal with 
the constitutionality of prayer in certain public settings, 
these cases do not address, more than indirectly, the 
propriety of the unlawful expenditure of public funds in the 
8
 Although the Society itself is tax exempt, its 
members clearly pay taxes to the State of Utah. 
Organizational standing is based upon the injury to its 
members, not to the organization itself. Sierra Club v. 
Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). In addition, even cursory 
examination of plaintiffs' complaint indicates that 
plaintiffs did indeed make allegations of individual harm. 
Complaint 5 12 - 18. 
16 
context of litigation to which Utah is not a party.9 Unless 
the Society is granted standing, the state constitutional 
restraints upon this activity will remain unresolved. 
The Superintendent's odd suggestion that the Society 
has a greater interest than itself, is also unconvincing. 
Appellee's Brief at 19. The Superintendent suggests that 
because other litigation in which the Society is involved 
raises an issue similar to that raised herein, that the 
issue should be resolved in the other litigation rather than 
in this case. Id. Certainly, the Society has an equal 
interest in pursuing each of its claims pending in various 
Courts. The Society does not claim, and the Superintendent 
cannot legitimately assert the Society has, a greater 
interest in seeking relief from unconstitutional expenditure 
of public funds in one of its cases as opposed to another. 
Besides, this case has now reached the appellate level where 
a decision will have broad effect. The consideration under 
Jenkins7 standing analysis of a litigant having "a greater 
interest" in litigating and resolving an issue applies to 
another party and not to the same party that may be 
litigating a similar issue in another case. 
9
 In addition, resolution of the issue in this case by 
this Court may aid in answering similar questions in other 
litigation in which the Society is currently involved. 
17 
Calling his expenditure "relatively small," the 
Superintendent contends that the issue of unlawful 
expenditures is of insufficient importance to warrant 
judicial attention. The Superintendent forgets that the 
constitutional prohibition of aid to religious exercise is 
absolute under the Utah establishment clause and that the 
authors of this provision clearly did not see any unlawful 
expenditure as "relatively small." Utah Const. Article I, § 
4. In addition, our entire judicial system is built upon 
the notion that illegality, especially unconstitutionality, 
is never a trifling matter. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 
(1983) (Brennan, J. dissenting) (no de minimis violations of 
the establishment clause); Appellant's Brief at 31-38 
(discussion of establishment law of states having consti-
tutions similar to that of Utah). 
The Society has established that under the standing 
analysis, they have a clear right to seek resolution of 
their claims before this Court. The Society7s complaint 
clearly alleges direct, adverse impact caused to them by the 
Superintendent's actions and otherwise serves as the basis 
for plaintiffs7 access to this Court. 
18 
III. Article I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution Prohibits the 
Superintendent From Spending Public Funds to Finance a Pro-
Prayer Appeal. 
Unquestionably, the Superintendent gave the Rhode 
Island school district ten-thousand dollar ($10,000.00) to 
seek a writ of certiorari and reversal of a First Circuit 
injunction against prayer at public school graduations 
before the United States Supreme Court — thus, the 
Superintendent violated the Utah Constitution, None of the 
Superintendent's justifications of his actions can obscure 
the unlawfulness of this mis-appropriation of public funds, 
A. The Society Cannot be Faulted for Failure to Build a 
Record in its Appeal of a Judgment on the Pleadings. 
Oddly, the Superintendent urges that dismissal by the 
trial court was appropriate in this case (and apparently 
dismissal by this court would be similarly appropriate) 
because the Society "did not support its allegations with a 
hearing, record or other factual basis." Appellee's Brief 
at 21. As established above, a motion to dismiss does not 
involve the presentation of or adjudication of facts. 
Instead, in reviewing a dismissal on the basis of a Rule 
12(b) motion, the court is restricted to a ruling on the 
pleadings and must assume the factual allegations in the 
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complaint to be true. Arrow Industries, supra, 767 P.2d at 
936. 
Nonsensically the Superintendent suggests that in the 
absence of "factual support for the Society's claims," this 
Court should "presume that the lower court's decision 
[granting the Superintendent's motion to dismiss] is correct 
and so affirm." Appellee's Brief at 23. Necessarily, a 
motion to dismiss does not rest on factual support, Id. 
(motion to dismiss appropriate only when there is no set of 
provable facts to support plaintiff's claim), and this Court 
owes no deference to conclusions by the lower court 
concerning legal questions. Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 
245, 247 (Utah 1988). If this Court over rules the motion 
to dismiss granted below, but decides that disputed facts 
prevent a ruling on the merits, this Court should remand the 
case to the lower Court for necessary factual determin-
ations. In the mean time, the Society's "mere [factual] 
allegations" are presumed to be true10 and the Society is 
not obligated to bolster its case with* evidence for its 
claims, either now nor before the trial court. 
10
 Alternatively, this Court could decide that because 
the resolution of this case does not depend upon disputed 
facts, a ruling on the merits is appropriate. Only at that 
point would the complaint no longer be construed in a light 
most favorable to the Society. 
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B. Undisputed Facts Readily Indicate that the Super-
intendent's Financial Support of Prayer in Public Schools 
Violates Article I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution. 
Next, the Superintendent insists that his ten-thousand 
dollar ($10,000.00) gift to the Rhode Island school district 
did not violated the Utah Constitution. He contends that 
neither the purpose nor the effect of his actions was to 
promote prayer at high school ceremonies. For several 
reasons, these assertions lack merit. Despite the 
Superintendent's claims of neutrality, his substantial 
payment to the Rhode Island school district, enabling the 
defeated to contest the First Circuit's refusal to allow 
prayer in public schools, represents deliberate support of 
religious exercise. Even more evident, the Superintendent's 
expenditure had the effect of unconstitutionally promoting 
religious exercise. Importantly, even under federal establ-
ishment law — less demanding than the strict provisions of 
the Utah Constitution — government action which has either 
the effect or the purpose of promoting religion is 
impermissible. Under both the purpose and effect analysis, 
the Superintendent's support of the prayer in public schools 
is unlawful because it fails to comply with the state's 
affirmative obligation to "pursue a course of complete 
neutrality toward religion." Wallace v. Jaffree. 472 U.S. 
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38, 60 (1985); Lemon v. Kurtsman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971) 
(confirming the affirmative nature of the state duty toward 
neutrality and non-endorsement). 
Interestingly, to argue for the neutrality of his 
actions, the Superintendent contends that "had the writ [of 
certiorari in the Rhode Island case] been denied the Utah 
cases would have continued at great expense and detriment of 
the public schools."11 Appellee,s Brief at 27. This 
comment ignores that if. certiorari had not been pursued in 
the Rhode Island case, previous United States Supreme Court 
11
 The Superintendent continually paints a misleading 
picture of the "chaos" in federal and state courts in Utah. 
He argues that prudence required that he financially assist 
Providence in its crusade to gain approval of prayer in high 
schools. Only this measure, he insists, would bring "order 
to a chaotic situation." Appellee's Brief at 24. However 
to effectuate a legal and guaranteed method for ending 
litigation in these courts, the Superintendent only needed 
to stop the practice of allowing prayers at graduations and 
other ceremonies in Utah's public schools. Clearly, the 
state is under no obligation to provide a forum for 
religious exercise. Abinaton School District v. Schempp, 
374 U.S. 203, 225-226 (1963) (soundly rejecting the 
arguments that unless "religious exercises are permitted a 
^religion of secularism' is established in the schools," and 
that free exercise means the "majority could use the 
machinery of the State to practice its beliefs"). No 
litigant has ever been successful in an attempt to compel 
public schools to hold public prayers. See Roberts v. 
Madicran, 921 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1990) (actions taken to 
avoid the violation of the establishment clause do not fail 
the Lemon test). In addition, claims based on Utah 
constitutional law would not be solved by any decisions in 
federal law. 
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precedent, decisions in the Tenth Circuit and Utah state 
constitutional law would and did clearly ban public prayer 
in Utah public schools. Nothing could be gained by seeking 
certiorari other than another attempt to get judicial 
approval of religious exercise in public schools. 
In the absence of a ruling from the United States 
Supreme Court in the Rhode Island case, the Superintendent 
would clearly have been guided by past precedent from the 
highest court and the Tenth Circuit. Law from both these 
forums produce as conclusive a determination on the issue of 
prayer in Utah schools as a Supreme Court decision in the 
Rhode Island case. 
Recently, the United States Supreme Court confirmed 
that the three-prong Lemon test provides the only appro-
priate scheme to analyzes establishment challenges to 
religious activity in the public schools. The Court 
concluded that "[t]he Lemon test has been applied in all 
[establishment clause] cases since its adoption in 1971, 
except in Marsh v. Chambers" and the historical approach 
adopted in Marsh "is not useful in determining the proper 
roles of church and state in public schools . . . ." 
Edwards v. Acruillard. 482 U.S. 578, 107 S.Ct 2573, 2577 
(1987). 
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The Superintendent's argument is as implausible as the 
contention that a financial contribution to a political 
candidate, "merely intended to insure that the individual 
gains access to the ballot," is a neutral act. Certainly, a 
contributor could claim that she was not biased toward the 
candidate whom she sponsored, insisting that she was only 
interested in "resolving" the election. Any one confronted 
with this argument would insist any such payments necess-
arily support the chosen candidate over the opposition. 
Similarly, payment to the Rhode Island school board to 
support its litigation and its goals could not be neutral. 
The school district was seeking judicial approval of its 
practice of allowing prayer at public school graduations. 
In its petition for certiorari — a document financed in 
part by Utah taxpayers — the school district did not 
maintain a neutral stance but instead argued aggressively 
for prayer. This pro-prayer position was obviously 
anticipated by the Superintendent. Certainly, the 
Superintendent could not expect the Rhode Island school 
board to be neutral. The structure of the adversarial 
judicial system entails that the Rhode Island school 
district defend its prayer practice through every avenue 
available. 
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Whether under an effect analysis or a purpose analysis, 
the Superintendent's actions were unconstitutional. His 
attempts to characterize his pro-prayer appropriation as 
neutral do not hide the clearly biased nature of his 
contribution. The Superintendent spent public funds to help 
the Rhode Island school board appeal an injunction against 
prayer at public school graduation ceremonies. The purpose 
and the effect of this expenditure was to gain judicial 
approval of religious exercise in schools nationwide. 
CONCLUSION 
The arguments in the Superintendent's Brief have failed 
to lend credence to his attempts to avoid a ruling on the 
propriety of his aid/gift to the Rhode Island pro-prayer 
legal campaign. That issue is not moot. The Superintendent 
has offered no convincing arguments to weaken the Society's 
claim that this action, although, in part, technically moot, 
deserves judicial attention. In addition, he ignores that 
the Utah Courts have long been open to taxpayers. Given the 
reluctance of the Utah Courts to deny plaintiffs a forum for 
resolution of their claims, the Society has a clear right to 
a hearing on the merits of this case. The Society's request 
2J5 
for declaratory judgment is not moot and should have been 
considered by the trial court. 
Finally, the Superintendent has not successfully 
countered the Society,s claim that the Rhode Island gift was 
an unconstitutional expenditure of public funds. Rather 
than incidental and ancillary, the illegal appropriation of 
educational funds was direct financial aid in support of 
religious exercise and should be declared a violation of the 
Utah Constitution. 
Wherefore, the decision of the trial court should be 
reversed. This Court should enter a judgment granting the 
Society the relief they requested, declaring the Super-
intendent's appropriation unconstitutional under Article I, 
§ 4 of the Utah Constitution. 
Dated this 4th day of SEPTEMBER, 1992. 
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EXHIBIT 'L' 
AUGUST 26, 1992 
LETTER FROM BRIAN M. BARNARD 
TO CLERK, THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN 
AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
RE: PLEADING MISSING FROM RECORD ON APPEAL 
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UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204 
(801)328-9531 —328-9532 
Attorneys 
John Pace 
Brian M. Barnard 
August 26, 1992 
Alice Wong 
Court Clerk 
Third District Court 
240 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Chris Allen v. Taggart Case No, 910902848 
Supreme Court Case No. 92-0233 
Dear Ms, Wong: 
A pleading filed on July 8, 1991 in the above mentioned 
case has not been entered onto the court's index in the file 
which is now on appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. However, 
the pleading has been entered into the computer which 
indicates that it was filed on July 8, 1991. ' The name of 
the pleading is Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion 
to Dismiss. 
Please correct the index to include this pleading. The 
presence of that pleading in the file has been raised as an 
issue in the pending appeal. It is imperative that the 
index accurately reflect that the pleading was filed. 
If there are any questions please let me know. Thank 
you for your assistance. 
BMB/sj 
cc: John McAllister 
Asst. Attorney General 
Geoffrey Butler 
Clerk, Utah Supreme Court 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed four (4) 
true and correct copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF 
APPELLANTS to: 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
JOHN s. MCALLISTER 
Attorneys General 
Beneficial Life Tower 
3 6 South State Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
on the 4th day of SEPTEMBER 1992, postage prepaid in the 
United States Postal Service, 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
asb\sostag. scr\soscase\bmb 
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